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ABSTRACT 
Glancy and Yadav (2010) developed a computational fraud detection model (CFDM) that 
successfully detected financial reporting fraud in the text of the management 's discussion and 
analysis (MDA) portion of annual filings with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). This work extends the use of the CFDM to additional genre, demonstrates 
the generalizability of the CFDM and the use of text mining for quantitatively detecting 
deception in asynchronous text. It also demonstrates that writers committing fraud use words 
differently from truth tellers. 
Keywords: asynchronous communication deception, CFDM, deception, text mining, financial 
reporting fraud , identity theft , deception detection 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Deception is the intentional misleading of 
another such that they draw an inaccurate 
conclusion (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Carlson, 
George, Burgoon, Adkins, and White, 2004; 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J. , Malone, B. E. , 
Muhlenbruck, L. , Charlton, K. , and Cooper, 
H. , 2003). Fraud is criminal deception as 
defined by the laws of the country. Research 
has found deception and fraud to be important 
questions because the costs of deception and 
fraud are extensive. Investors lost billions of 
dollars when financial reporting fraud was 
uncovered at Enron, WorldCom, and 
Broadcom. Some of these investors were 
pension plans; the loss resulted in reduced 
pensions of the plan members. Many 
individuals lost their jobs, which cost 
taxpayers ' unemployment compensation. While 
these three are widely known examples of 
financial reporting fraud, they are certainly not 
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the only ones . And yet, fraud is difficult to 
recognized. Often times, fraud will be 
committed for several years before it is 
discovered. Madov's Ponzi scheme lasted for 
more than 14 years before discovery 
(Markopolos, 2005). 
A writer of deceptive text should know 
that the writing is deceptive. The problem has 
been how the reader can detect deceptive 
writing. In the past , many researchers 
attempted to find cues that indicate that 
writing is deceptive. DeP aulo, et al. (2003) 
looked at 1338 different studies that attempted 
to find cues to that would confirm deception; 
158 deception cues were identified (DePaulo et 
al., 2003). These cues were grouped into five 
different sets of predictions relating to liars 
and truth tellers. The predictive sets were: 
liars will be less forthcoming than truth tellers; 
liars will have more discrepancies than truth 
tellers; liars will be less positive and pleasant 
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than truth tellers; liars will be tenser than 
truth tellers; and liars ' stories will have fewer 
common imperfections and less unusual 
content than truth tellers. The cues to these 
predictive sets were divided into the following 
groups: verbal, vocal, facial, active (body 
positioning), quantity, time, rate of speaking, 
pauses, types of words used, voice amplitude, 
nervousness, and other behavioral cues. 
In the meta-analysis, twenty-five cues were 
statistically significant; and of the twenty-five, 
only thirteen were relevant to text (DePaulo et 
al., 2003). The cues relevant to text were 
shorter response length, providing fewer 
details, providing less sensory information, 
blocking access to information, increased 
response latency, less logical structure, greater 
internal discrepancy, fewer self-references, less 
immediacy ( actives vs. passives and 
affirmatives vs. negatives), increased tentative 
constructions, less cooperative, more negative, 
and less contextual embedding. The cues only 
provide a potential method for detecting 
deception. 
Glancy and Yadav (2010) developed a 
computational fraud detection model ( CFDM) 
that successfully detected financial reporting 
fraud in the text of the management 's 
discussion and analysis (MDA) portion of 
annual filings with the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The method 
used text mining and clustering of the singular 
value decomposition (SVD) (Albright , 2004) of 
the document-term matrix. The CFDM was 
able to classify a MDA as fraudulent or non-
fraudulent. The results were very highly 
significant, p = 0.0059. A sample of thirty 
MDAs-ten fraudulent and twenty non-
fraudulent- were tested. Nine out of ten 
fraudulent MDAs tested as fraudulent. The 
company that was a false negative was retested 
using the MDA of the following year, and the 
retest was positive (i.e., fraudulent). Sixteen of 
twenty non-fraudulent MDAs tested as non-
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fraudulent. The false positives may have been 
unidentified fraudulent reports; it is not 
possible to tell whether they are true false 
positives. The result was that the CFDM was 
very successful at classifying companies as 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent. The CFDM 
was quantitative, and it did not require human 
interpretation of the text. 
We use the CFDM methodology (Glancy 
and Yadav, 2010) to answer the question: 'is 
the CFDM generalizable to other genres than 
the MDA?' We consider this question in the 
remainder of this article. 
Section 2 discusses the CFD M in more 
detail and the methodology used to create the 
model. Section 3 applies the methodology to 
create models for detecting deception in three 
additional genres. Section 4 discusses 
conclusions, limitations, and future work. 
2. COlVlPUTATIONAL 
FRAUD DETECTION 
MODEL (CFDM) 
The CFDM (Glancy and Yadav, 2011) was 
created for detecting financial reporting fraud 
by text mining the management's discussion 
and analysis (MDA) of a company's annual 
report. The process used to create the CFDM 
is described below. 
The first step was selecting fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent companies. The SEC's 
accounting and auditing enforcement releases 
(AAER) were reviewed. The SEC issues an 
AAER either during or at the conclusion of an 
investigation of accounting or auditing 
misconduct. The AAER states the reason for 
the SEC's charge of misconduct; these will 
normally require the company to restate their 
financial report. The companies that were 
selected as fraudulent were the ones the SEC 
accused of fraud, and they either admitted the 
fraud or were convicted of fraud in Federal 
Court. Most companies that committed 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
 Detecting Deception in Asynchronous Text 
financial reporting fraud did so over a period of 
years. The annual report used for text mining 
was in the period the SEC identified in the 
AAER. If a company knows that they are 
under investigation by the SEC, they must 
include that knowledge in the annual report. 
The MDA selected was for the latest reporting 
period that did not mention an SEC 
investigation. This period was chosen because 
it was unlikely that the company knew at this 
point that the SEC was investigating them. 
The report that first mentioned the 
investigation was normally in the year prior to 
the SEC issuing the AAER, although in some 
cases the company knew of the SEC 
investigation for several years before the 
AAER was issued. 
For each fraudulent company selected, a 
non-fraudulent company was selected. The first 
criterion for a non-fraudulent company was 
that they had not filed an amended financial 
report with the SEC in the 10 years preceding 
or proceeding the reporting year chosen for the 
fraudulent company. The second criterion was 
that they had the same SIC code (i.e., they 
were in the same industry). The third criterion 
was that they were approximately the same 
size. This criterion applied only if there was 
more than one company that met the first two 
criteria. 
The second step was to prepare each MDA 
for text mining by eliminating all non-text 
items. These included tables of numbers, notes 
to tables, all headers and footers, punctuation, 
and proper nouns. The individual MDAs were 
saved as text files. 
The third step was creating the document 
set and text mining. All documents, both 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent, were imported 
in SAS® Enterprise Miner™ (EM) software. 
Common words also called stop words were 
eliminated (e.g. , a, an, the, and, for). 
Punctuation was removed and all 
capitalization was converted to lower case. The 
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words were converted to terms by stemming. 
The process of stemming reduces the word to 
its base (e.g., absolutely becomes absolute, 
finalize and finally become final). After 
stemming, the words are referred to as 'terms.' 
Stemming as used in this text mining also 
identifies synonyms and separates words that 
have different meanings depending on the part 
of speech (e.g., a bank is a noun and 
synonymous with a financial institution, bank 
as a verb would refer to turning an airplane). 
Text-mining is performed by starting with the 
term document frequency matrix and then 
calculating the single value decomposition 
(SVD) (Albright, 2004) of the term-document 
matrix. The SVDs are clustered ( de Ville, 
2006; Gao and Zhang, 2005; Roiger and Geatz, 
2003). Each SVD identifies a document. The 
clustering is bottom up (hierarchical) based on 
the distance between the SVDs. The identity 
of the documents remains after the SVD is 
created, but the individual terms in the 
document are not visible. However, the text-
mining program can calculate the probability 
of a term being in a cluster and report the 
terms with the highest probability for a 
cluster. The explanation of the SVD is beyond 
this paper, but Albright (2004) provides a 
complete description of the SVD and its use in 
text-mining. 
The fourth step is analyzing the results. 
The model had very good separation between 
the fraudulent MDAs and the non-fraudulent 
MDAs with 66 of 69 documents clustering 
correctly. The three that did not cluster 
correctly were false positives-companies 
meeting the non-fraudulent criteria but 
clustering with the fraudulent companies. The 
model is based on the SVDs of the documents 
used to create it. The model is used to test 
other MD As to determine if they are 
fraudulent or not. When a fraudulent 
document is added to the original set of 
documents and the SVD process is repeated, it 
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should test as fraudulent by clustering with the 
fraudulent documents. A non-fraudulent 
document should test as not fraudulent and 
cluster with the non-fraudulent documents. 
The model was used to classify an 
additional 31 MDAs, eleven fraudulent and 
twenty non-fraudulent. The companies were 
chosen using the same criteria that was used 
for the original fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies. Ten of the eleven fraudulent MDAs 
were correctly identified. Sixteen of the twenty 
non-fraudulent MDAs were correctly identified. 
The results were evaluated with the sign test 
(Conover, 1999), and the p-values for both 
tests were less than 0.01. 
3. APPLICATION OF 
THE CFDM PROCESS 
The CFDM was successful in detecting 
fraudulent MDAs. In order to demonstrate 
that the CFDM methodology is generalizable 
we investigate its use in an additional area in 
financial reporting and in fraudulent 
unsolicited email (spam). The CFDM process 
was given a different test in financial reporting 
fraud. The financial reporting fraud test was 
on the text of the notes to the financial 
statements of annual reports. The MDA is 
normally written by one of the chief executives 
of a company; we expect him to know if the 
report is fraudulent. Accountants write the 
notes to the financial statements; we do not 
know if the accountant who wrote the note 
knew that the report was fraudulent, but we 
would anticipate that a good accountant would 
at least suspect that the financial statements 
were incorrect. The similarities between the 
notes to the financial statements and spam are 
that both are asynchronous and the authors of 
notes to the financial statements in an annual 
report are essentially anonymous to the reader 
as are the authors of the spam. 
Page 148 
Detecting Deception in Asynchronous Text 
We used spam e-mails because many 
unsolicited e-mails (spam) are fraudulent. The 
global cost of spam is estimated at $130 billion 
annually (Jennings, 2009). The cost to US 
businesses is estimated at $42 billion annually. 
We did two tests on spam. One spam test was 
on e-mail that attempted to steal identity, and 
the other test was on spam that attempted 
money theft. Both financial reporting fraud 
and fraudulent e-mails are asynchronous and 
relatively anonymous. In both domains, the 
reader can only make assumptions about the 
identity of the writer. Both are available 
electronically. Both are sent with the 
expectation of deceiving the reader. Both are 
often more than just deception; they are 
fraudulent. 
An estimated 62 trillion spam are sent 
annually. Spam filters are biased toward 
legitimate e-mail and detect it at a rate of 
99. 99%. The bias toward detection of 
legitimate e-mail and preventing false positives 
or legitimate e-mail identified as spam (Yih, 
Goodman, and Hulten, 2006) causes the filters 
to pass on the recipient up to 5% of the spam. 
Of the estimated 62 trillion spam e-mails sent 
annually, spam filters will pass up to 3.1 
trillion spam e-mails to the recipient's inbox. 
In each of the three tests , the fraudulent 
documents were matched with legitimate 
documents from the same genre and in the 
same period. The total number of documents 
in each test varied from 69 to 110. The 
documents were analyzed using the CFDM 
methodology as described above ( Glancy and 
Yadav, 2011). The sample size for each study 
was chosen for a statistical power over 90% 
with an effect size of 0.20 to 0.30 (Cohen, 
1988). The CFDM was used to create the 
single value decomposition of the term-
document matrix and to cluster the 
documents. The text mining clusters the 
document set into as many clusters as 
appropriate for the document set; the 
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maximum number of clusters for a document 
set is user specified and was set to forty for all 
studies. 
3.1 Annual Financial Report 
Notes Test 
We were able to use the same data set as 
Glancy & Yadav (2010). Instead of using the 
Table 1. 
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MDA, we extracted the notes to the financial 
reports and followed the CFDM methodology. 
The results of the model were highly 
significant, p-value less than 0.001 with 3 false 
positives and three false negatives. The results 
are shown in Table 1. 
Clusterinq results of the notes to annual financial reports test of the CFDM methodoloq1.1. 
Clustering Results Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified 
63 
Percentage correctly 
classified 
False Positive 
False Negative 
p-value 
The notes from 11 fraudulent annual 
reports and 20 non-fraudulent annual reports 
were tested using the notes model. Each set of 
notes was tested individually by adding them 
to the document set and then re-running the 
model. One of the 11 fraudulent documents 
was a false negative and three of the 20 non-
fraudulent were false positives. The p-value 
was less than 0.001. 
3. 2 Spam. Email Tests 
The two tests on spam were on email that 
either tried to steal identity or money. We sent 
a request on Facebook for people to collect 
email that escaped their spam filter and made 
it into their inbox. The individual determined 
that the email was stealing identity or money 
and labeled it as such and forwarded it to the 
authors. Over 40 people responded and over 
2000 money-theft spam and over 3000 identity-
theft spam were collected. The two tests are 
discussed below. 
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6 
91.3% 
3 
3 
2 X 10·13 
3. 2 .1 Money Theft Spam. Email Test 
In order to compare money theft email to 
legitimate email that requests money, over 
2,000 legitimate e-mails were collected from 
legitimate sources that asked the recipient for 
money (e.g., The Susan G. Komen Foundation, 
the March of Dimes, and the American Cancer 
Society). The spams and legitimate e-mail used 
in the study were randomly chosen from those 
collected. Originally the model was created 
with fifty-five spams and fifty-five legitimate e-
mails, which were saved as plain text and put 
into a database. The results of the model were 
very highly significant, p-value less than 0.001, 
and are shown in Table 2. The number of 
emails was increased to 100 for each type of 
email ( spam and legitimate) to increase the 
probability of an email being incorrectly 
identified and to increase the possible number 
of clusters. The model was replicated 20 times 
with the 100 emails randomly chosen from 
legitimate emails and 100 randomly chosen 
from money theft spam. The results in each 
test were very highly significant, p-value less 
than 0.001. In each trial, the number of 
Page 149
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clusters was two, even though the allowable number of clusters was set to 40. 
Clustering Results 
Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified 
104 
Percentage correctly classified 
False Positive 
False Negative 
p-value 
3 . 2 . 2 Identity Theft Spam Email T est 
In order to compare the spam email to 
legitimate email, over 2,000 legitimate e-mails 
were collected from the sources that were 
spoofed by the spam, such as banks, 
investment companies, and credit card 
companies. The spams and legitimate e-mail 
used in the study were randomly chosen from 
those collected. The first model used fifty-five 
spams and fifty-five legitimate e-mails, which 
Table 3 
6 
94.54% 
2 
4 
3.300 X 10-24 
were converted to plain text and put into a 
single database. The CFDM methodology was 
applied to the single database and the results 
were very highly significant, p-value less than 
0.001, as shown Table 3. This test was also 
replicated 20 times with 100 randomly chosen 
spams and 100 randomly chosen legitimate 
email. The results were consistent with p-
values for each model less than 0.001. Again, 
the allowable number of clusters was set to 40, 
but in every case the number of clusters was 2. 
Clusterinq results of the notes to identity theft spam test of the CFDM methodoloqy. 
Clustering Results 
Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified 
107 
Percentage correctly classified 
False Positive 
False Negative 
p-value 
3.3 Results of the CFDM T ests 
The three tests of the CFD M process 
replicated the results of the original CFDM 
(Glancy and Yadav, 2011) in two domains and 
three genres. The CFDM created in each genre 
was successful at differentiating fraudulent text 
from legitimate or non-fraudulent text . The 
percentage of correctly identified documents 
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3 
97.27% 
1 
2 
3.325 xl0-28 
exceeded 91 % in all tests. The average of the 
three tests was 94.37%. These results exceeded 
those of Goel, Gangolly, Faerman, and Uzuner 
(2010), using a support vector machine 
methodology; the average correctly identified 
in their three tests was 88.84%. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS, 
LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE-WORK 
All three tests on asynchronous text used the 
CFDM methodology to create models that 
were able to successfully distinguish legitimate 
asynchronous text from fraudulent text. In all 
cases the number of clusters was two, 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent. There were no 
additional clusters. This confirms the accuracy 
of the hierarchical clustering of the SVDs. This 
also confirms that the CFDM methodology is 
generalizable beyond financial reporting using 
the MDA. Repeating the CFDM methodology 
20 times on money-theft spam and 20 times on 
identity-theft spam confirmed that the CFDM 
methodology is repeatable and has potential 
for developing a quantitative method of 
filtering email. This is especially significant 
when considering that the email used in the 
tests had already escaped detection by 
conventional email filters. 
A potential limitation of this work is that 
only two genres were used for the testing, 
financial reporting and spam. Future work can 
include expanding the CFDM to additional 
asynchronous genre to further confirm the 
generalizability of the CFDM methodology. 
Another limitation is that although we have a 
quantitative method of detecting fraud in 
asynchronous text, we do not know why it 
works. The use of the SVD in text-mining does 
not allow inspection of the terms in each 
cluster and their frequency. It has been 
experimentally proven to be successful, but at 
this time we do not know what is in the text 
that allows fraudulent documents to cluster 
together when using the singular value 
decomposition of the reduced document text 
matrix. We can conclude that people 
committing fraud use words differently from 
those who are telling the truth. We can further 
suggest that the way those committing fraud 
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use words is subconscious; because if they were 
aware of the way they were using words, they 
would modify their writing to conceal the 
fraud. Further work will utilize the results 
from these tests to determine if a theoretical 
basis for explaining the success of CFD M can 
be developed. 
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